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FIRE SALE! THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION TO DETERMINE
JUST COMPENSATION IN WASHINGTON EMINENT
DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS
Paul W. Moomaw
Abstract: Jurisdictions across the United States are split on the issue of whether evidence
of environmental contamination should be admissible to determine just compensation in an
eminent domain proceeding. Jurisdictions that admit this evidence reason that environmental
contamination is a property characteristic that necessarily affects the value of the property.
Those that exclude the evidence cite procedural due process concerns and the risk of extra
liability for the landowner. Washington's Model Toxics Control Act (MTCA) establishes a
system of assigning liability and recovering cleanup costs for environmental contamination.
No Washington court has addressed whether evidence of environmental contamination should
be admissible to determine just compensation in an eminent domain proceeding. This
Comment argues that, under MTCA and Washington eminent domain law, the evidence
should not be admitted, because its admission (1) would violate the prohibition in Washington
eminent domain law against speculative evidence, (2) would infringe upon the procedural due
process rights of landowners under MTCA, and (3) may result in additional liability on the
part of the landowners and extra recovery on the part of the condemning authority.
The Smith family owns a small, independent service station alongside
a Washington highway, selling gasoline and services to motorists who
pass by.t Recently, motorists using the highway have increased in
number, and the Smiths are delighted to see business booming. However,
the increase in traffic has also put pressure on the highway system, and it
is clear that the two-lane, winding country road is no longer sufficient.
State officials have determined that the only solution is to widen the
highway to four lanes. Unfortunately, the Smiths' service station is in the
path of the planned highway expansion. The Smith family soon receives
notice that their property is needed for the highway project, but that they
will receive fair market value for the land.
Unbeknownst to the Smiths, the land beneath the service station has
become a small environmental catastrophe. As appraisers for the State
investigate the land to determine its fair market value, they discover that
the underground fuel storage tanks are leaking and have been doing so
for years. Accordingly, the appraisers come up with a market value for
the land that is significantly less than it would be without the newly
discovered contamination. Meanwhile, officials from Washington's
1221
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Department of Ecology (DOE) have begun an investigation of their own,
with the ultimate intention of holding the Smiths liable for the costs of
cleanup under Washington's environmental cleanup statute.
Two legal forces have collided on this Washington highway at the
intersection between modem environmental regulations and traditional
eminent domain law, leaving the Smiths and their family business as the
unwitting victims. Under traditional eminent domain principles, an entity
that takes land through the exercise of eminent domain must pay a
landowner "just compensation,"' which is generally deemed to be the fair
market value of the land, based upon all of the "elements reasonably
affecting value."3  Certainly, environmental contamination is a
characteristic that affects the market value of land. On the other hand,
Washington's environmental cleanup statute, the Model Toxics Control
Act (MTCA),4 makes liability strict, joint, and several,' and holds past
and current landowners alike liable for cleanup.6 Hence, the Smiths find
themselves in the position of receiving less value for their land, while
concurrently being held responsible for the cleanup of the contamination.
Jurisdictions across the United States are split on the issue of whether
evidence of environmental contamination should be admissible to
determine just compensation in an eminent domain action. Some courts
have determined that environmental contamination is a property
characteristic that bears upon the land's market value.' Therefore, those
courts deem evidence of contamination admissible.' Courts in other
jurisdictions have concluded that adjudicating the issue of environmental
contamination in an eminent domain proceeding raises various troubling
issues, including procedural due process concerns and the risk of double
liability for the landowner.9 Therefore, these courts hold that the
evidence should be excluded."0 Thus far, no Washington court decision
has addressed this issue.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16.
3. In re Town of Issaquah, 31 Wash. 2d 556, 564, 197 P.2d 1018, 1022 (1948).
4. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D (2000).
5. Id. § 70.105D.040(2).
6. Id. § 70.105D.040(1); see also infra note 62 and accompanying text.
7. See infra Part III.B.
8. See infra Part III.B.
9. See infra Part III.A.
10. See infra Part III.A.
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This Comment argues that, under Washington law, evidence of
environmental contamination should not be admissible to determine just
compensation in an eminent domain proceeding. Part I provides an
overview of eminent domain law in Washington, covering its statutory
basis, procedural aspects, and judicial interpretation, with particular
attention to what constitutes just compensation. Part II discusses MTCA,
and gives a synopsis of the relevant regulatory procedures the DOE has
enacted. Part I outlines the current state of jurisprudence on the issue of
admitting evidence of environmental contamination in eminent domain
proceedings in jurisdictions across the United States. Finally, Part IV
argues that, given the current state of the law in Washington, evidence of
environmental contamination is inappropriate in an eminent domain
proceeding because (1) it would violate the prohibition in Washington
eminent domain law against speculative evidence, (2) it would infringe
upon the procedural due process rights of landowners under MTCA, and
(3) it may result in extra liability on the part of the landowner and extra
recovery on the part of the condemning authority.
I. EMINENT DOMAIN LAW IN WASHINGTON STATE
Eminent domain is the inherent power of a government to take private
property for public use." The power of governmental entities to take
property through the exercise of eminent domain is limited by the federal
and state constitutions.12 Every eminent domain proceeding includes a
determination that the property will be used for public purposes, and an
assessment of just compensation to the owner.'3 Just compensation is
defined as the fair market value of the property, or what a willing buyer
would pay a willing seller for the property in an open-market
transaction.'4  Washington courts rely on numerous valuation
methodologies to determine fair market value.' 5
11. BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY 541 (7th ed. 1999). The exercise of the eminent domain power is
frequently referred to as "condemnation." 17 WILLUAM B. STOEBUCK, REAL ESTATE: PROPERTY
LAW, in WASHINGTON PRACTICE, § 9.1 (1995).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. V; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 16.
13. See infra Part I.B.
14. In reTown of Issaquah, 31 Wash. 2d 556, 564, 197 P.2d 1018, 1022 (1948).
15. See infra Part I.C.1.
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A. Sources ofAuthority for Eminent Domain
The State of Washington inherently possesses the authority to take
private land through the exercise of eminent domain as an attribute of
state sovereignty. 16 However, under the United States and Washington
constitutions, property taken pursuant to eminent domain must be
necessary for "public use," and the governmental entity must pay the
landowner "just compensation."" The state government may delegate the
power to local government entities, which do not possess the inherent
power of eminent domain. 8
The Washington Legislature has enacted legislation governing the
state's own eminent domain power and delegating the power to various
other entities.' 9 The legislation requires governmental entities to perform
certain procedures before condemning property under eminent domain.
For example, the condemnor must provide the landowner with adequate
notice.20 Moreover, the legislation requires a hearing to determine
whether the property is necessary for "public use" and an opportunity for
a jury trial to assess "just compensation.""1
16. See City of Tacoma v. Welcker, 65 Wash. 2d 677, 683, 399 P.2d 330, 334 (1965) ("The
power of eminent domain is an attribute of sovereignty. It is an inherent power of the state, not
derived from, but limited by, the fundamental principles of the constitution."); see also STOEBUCK,
supra note 11, § 9.3.
17. The Washington State Constitution provides that "[n]o private property shall be taken or
damaged for public or private use without just compensation having first been made." WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 16. Similarly, the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that "nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The question of what properly constitutes "public use" is beyond the scope of this Comment, which
focuses on the "just compensation" requirement.
18. See Welcker, 65 Wash. 2d at 683, 399 P.2d at 334-35 (stating that a municipal corporation,
unlike the state government, does not have the inherent power to take property through eminent
domain, but "may exercise such power only when it is expressly so authorized by the state
legislature"); see also STOEBUCK, supra note 11, § 9.3.
19. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 8.04.010-.191 (state), 8.08.010-.150 (counties), 8.12.010-.580 (cities),
8.16.010-.160 (school districts), 8.20.010-180 (corporations) (2000). This Comment focuses on the
issue from the broad perspective of the state's power of eminent domain; any difference between it
and the more limited powers of other entities is insignificant for the purposes of this Comment.
20. Id. § 8.04.020.
21. Id. §§ 8.04.070-.080. Of course, the parties may forego judicial proceedings if they settle
upon an amount of compensation that is satisfactory to all. Washington's eminent domain statute
provides that "[e]very reasonable effort shall be made to acquire expeditiously real property by
negotiation." Id. § 8.26.180.
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B. The Exercise of Eminent Domain
A Washington eminent domain proceeding consists of three discrete
phases: a finding that the property to be condemned is necessary for
public use, an assessment of just compensation, and an order to transfer
title.' The condemning authority initiates an eminent domain action by
submitting a petition for appropriation to the superior court of the county
in which the property sits' and serving notice upon all interested
parties.24 Next, a hearing is held to ensure that the condemning authority
has notified all parties with an interest in the subject property and that the
property is truly necessary for public use.' If the government
successfully shows that the land is necessary for public use, the court
will issue an order adjudicating that the contemplated use of the property
is truly a public use,2" as well as an order to determine damages for the
taking of the property.
If the court issues an order for the determination of damages, a jury
trial is held to determine the proper amount of just compensation for the
property.28 This portion of the proceeding tends to be the most hotly
debated: the great majority of eminent domain cases focus upon the issue
of the proper measure of just compensation.29 Both the landowner and
22. STOEBUCK, supra note 11, § 9.26.
23. WASH. REv. CODE § 8.04.010. The petition must contain the names of any party that has an
interest in the property to be condemned, a description of the property, a description of the interests
to be condemned, the purposes for which the land is to be condemned, the authority for the
condemnation, a request that a jury determine the proper amount ofjust compensation, and a prayer
that the court award the property interest to the condemning authority. STOEBUCK, supra note 11,
§ 9.27.
24. WASH. REv. CODE § 8.04.020. Generally, the notice must contain a statement that the
condemnor seeks to condemn the property, a description of the property to be condemned, and a
statement of the place and time at which the petition is to be submitted to the court. STOEBUCK,
supra note 11, § 9.27.
25. WASH. REV. CODE § 8.04.070. "[W]hether the contemplated use be really public shall be a
judicial question, and determined as such, without regard to any legislative assertion that the use is
public." WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16. This language explains the requirement that there be a hearing to
determine whether the land has actually been taken for a public use. STOEBUCK, supra note 11,
§ 9.20. To meet the requirement that the property be necessary for public use, the court must make a
determination "(1) that the use is really public, (2) that the public interests require it, and (3) that the
property appropriated is necessary for the purpose." In re City of Seattle, 96 Wash. 2d 616, 625, 638
P.2d 549, 555 (1981).
26. WASH. REV. CODE § 8.04.070.
27. Id. § 8.04.080.
28. Id.
29. STOEBUCK, supra note 11, § 9.1.
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the condemning authority may present evidence bearing upon just
compensation, as neither party has the burden of proof with respect to
valuation.3"
C. Just Compensation
An entity that condemns private property under eminent domain must
pay the landowner "just compensation."'" Just compensation is based
upon the fair market value of the property, as defined by the amount a
willing buyer would pay a willing seller on the open market.32 The
driving principle behind the constitutional just compensation requirement
is that the property owner is entitled to be placed in the same monetary
position as he or she would have been had the property not been taken.33
Consequently, the condemnee must receive full value for the property.34
1. Valuation
Washington courts accept numerous valuation methodologies for
purposes of measuring the fair market value of property. The most
common valuation methods used in Washington are the capitalized rental
value method, the depreciated replacement cost method, and the
comparable sales method.35 Under the capitalized rental value approach,
the value of the land is measured according to the income it produces.36
Under the depreciated replacement cost method, an appraiser determines
the replacement cost of improvements, adjusts for depreciation, then
adds the market value of the land itself.37 Finally, under the comparable
sales method, a land's value is determined by comparing it to properties
30. See State v. Templeman, 39 Wash. App. 218,223, 693 P.2d 125, 128 (1984).
31. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 16.
32. In re City of Medina, 69 Wash. 2d 574, 578, 418 P.2d 1020, 1022 (1966) (citing In reTown
of Issaquah, 31 Wash. 2d 556, 564, 197 P.2d 1018, 1022 (1948); 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain
§ 137); see also State v. Sherrill, 13 Wash. App. 250, 255, 534 P.2d 598, 601 (1975).
33. State v. Trask, 98 Wash. App. 690, 697, 990 P.2d 976, 980 (2000) (concluding that pre- and
post-judgment interest are to be included in just compensation).
34. Id.
35. STOEBUCK, supra note 11, § 9.30.
36. See 4 JULIUS SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.02[1], at 12-72 (3d ed. Rev.
2000). At its most basic, this method would involve valuing the property according to how much
rental income it could generate, capitalized at a reasonable discount rate.
37. See id. Of course, the market value of the underlying land would have to be determined using
one of the other methodologies.
1226
Vol. 76:1221, 2001
Environmental Contamination and Eminent Domain
that have been sold within a reasonable period of time, and that are
similar in location, use, improvements, and other qualities?
Parties may present testimony regarding the value of the property
through expert witnesses, the property owner, or neighboring property
owners. Although experts typically testify about the value of property,39
"[a]n owner of property may testify as to its value (without qualifying as
an expert), upon the assumption that he is particularly familiar with it
and, because of his ownership, knows of the uses for which it is
particularly adaptable."4  Neighbors may also be particularly
knowledgeable with respect to the value of the property, and may be
allowed to testify thereto." For example, the Washington Supreme Court
has upheld admission of testimony of a neighbor who had only seen the
subject property from the road, reasoning that the decision to admit the
testimony was within the trial judge's sound discretion, and that such
testimony would go to the weight rather than the admissibility of the
evidence.42
2. Speculative Evidence
While Washington courts allow the trier of fact to consider a wide
array of factors that may affect the fair market value of property,43 these
factors must meet two basic requirements: (1) they must actually affect
the property's fair market value, and (2) they must be established by the
evidence.' Hence, evidence that is overly speculative is not admissible
to determine fair market value.4" For example, in In re City of Medina,46
the court held that the fair market value of unimproved property could
not be determined by comparing it with town lots that were fully platted
and developed.47 Basing a determination of the property's fair market
38. See id..
39. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Scott Pac. Terminal, Inc., 9 Wash. App. 364, 370-71, 512 P.2d
1137, 1142 (1973).
40. State v. Larson, 54 Wash. 2d 86, 88, 338 P.2d 135, 136 (1959) (citing Weber v. W. Seattle
Land & Improvement Co., 188 Wash. 512, 63 P.2d 418 (1936)).
41. Pac. N.W. Pipeline Corp. v. Myers, 50 Wash. 2d 288,291-92,311 P.2d 655, 657 (1957).
42. Id.
43. SeeIn reTown of Issaquah, 31 Wash. 2d 556, 564, 197 P.2d 1018, 1022 (1948).
44. State v. Williams, 68 Wash. 2d 946, 950,416 P.2d 350,353 (1966).
45. Id.; see also In re City of Medina, 69 Wash. 2d 574,578, 418 P.2d 1020, 1022-23 (1966).
46. 69 Wash. 2d 574,418 P.2d 1020 (1966).
47. Id. at 578, 418 P.2d at 1022-23.
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value on such evidence, the court held, would involve "pure
conjecture.""
In State v. Mottrnan Mercantile Co.,49 the Washington Supreme Court
stated that land containing mineral content may not be valued by
multiplying the number of cubic yards of the mineral in the land by a unit
price of the mineral as extracted.5 1 Mottman involved a piece of property
to be condemned that had potential value as a gravel pit. The court stated
that evidence of the present value of the mineral content in its natural
state was admissible on a cubic yard basis.5 However, evidence of the
gravel's market value as extracted would be inadmissible for determining
the land's fair market value, because such evidence would require
speculation about the cost of extraction, the extent and duration of
market demand for the minerals, marketing costs, and other variable
factors.5 2
Other decisions indicate that Washington courts consider the fear of
potentially dangerous conditions upon land to be overly speculative and,
therefore, inadmissible to determine just compensation in an eminent
domain proceeding. 3 In Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Myers, 4 a
corporation condemned an easement for the installation of a gas pipeline.
The court approved a jury instruction directing the jury to ignore a
witness's testimony regarding the effect that fear of gas transmission
lines had on the market value of the subject property.55 Additionally, in
State v. Evans,56 the Washington Supreme Court reversed a lower court's
decision that had admitted evidence of fear.57 The lower court had
declared that "[t]he psychological effect of an adverse condition, real or
48. Id. (quoting NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 18.11[2] (3d ed. Rev. 1962)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
49. 51 Wash. 2d 722, 321 P.2d 912 (1958).
50. Id. at 724-25, 321 P.2d at 914.
51. Id. at 725, 321 P.2d at 914.
52. Id.; see also State v. Larson, 54 Wash. 2d 86, 88, 338 P.2d 135, 136 (1959).
53. See. e.g., Pac. N.W. Pipeline Corp. v. Myers, 50 Wash. 2d 288, 290, 311 P.2d 655, 656
(1957); State v. Evans, 96 Wash. 2d 119, 127, 634 P.2d 845, 849 (1981), opinion amended, 649 P.2d
633 (1982).
54. 50 Wash. 2d 288, 311 P.2d 655 (1957).
55. Id. at 290, 311 P.2d at 656. Although the court was unwilling to reverse on the grounds that
the testimony was given, its refusal to do so was predicated on the fact that the limiting instruction
had been given. Id.
56. 96 Wash. 2d 119, 634 P.2d 845 (1981), opinion amended, 649 P.2d 633 (1982).
57. Id. at 128.
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imagined, on a potential buyer may [materially influence] the market
value of property.""5 Although the Washington Supreme Court did not
directly address the lower court's assertion that "real or imagined"
psychological effects may be considered in assessing fair market value, it
expressed concern that the jury was permitted to consider speculative
elements.5 9 The court reaffirmed Washington's standard that the only
elements that a jury should consider "are those which will actually affect
the fair market value of the property and which are established by the
evidence." 0
I. THE MODEL TOXICS CONTROL ACT
The Model Toxics Control Act (MTCA) is Washington's counterpart
to the federal environmental cleanup statute, the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).6"
MTCA provides a statutory framework to allocate liability for
environmental contamination, to raise funds for the cleanup of
contamination, and to prevent future contamination." MTCA makes
owners of contaminated property and other parties that are responsible
for the contamination liable for its cleanup.' It also creates certain
limited defenses to liability.65 Furthermore, MTCA requires the
prioritization of particularly contaminated sites' and compels remedial
action upon those sites that are deemed to warrant investigation and
58. State v. Evans, 26 Wash. App. 251, 261, 612 P.2d 442, 449 (1980) ("These effects and their
impact on the market value have been recognized in cases involving the inherent fear of electricity
and gas transmission lines."), rev d, 96 Wash. 2d 119,634 P.2d 845, opinion amended, 649 P.2d 633
(1982).
59. Evans, 96 Wash. 2d at 127, 634 P.2d at 849.
60. Id.
61. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D (2000).
62. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994 &Supp. V 1999). Although CERCLA maybe equally applicable
with respect to the issues discussed here, this Comment focuses primarily on Washington law.
Hence, CERCLA is beyond its scope.
63. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.010. A "contaminant" is "any hazardous substance that does
not occur naturally or occurs at greater than natural background levels." WASH. ADMIN. CODE
§ 173-340-200 (2001). "'Environment' means any plant, animal, natural resource, surface water
(including underlying sediments), ground water, drinking water supply, land surface (including
tidelands and shorelands) or subsurface strata, or ainbient air within the state of Washington or under
the jurisdiction of the state of Washington." Id.
64. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.040(l).
65. Id. § 70.105D.040(3).
66. Id. § 70.105D.030(2)(b).
1229
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cleanup.67 MTCA provides due process to landowners by giving them the
right to assert defenses to liability.
6 1
A. Liability and Defenses Under MTCA
Under MTCA, any current owner or operator of a contaminated site,
and any past owner who contributed to the contamination, is a potentially
liable party (PLP) for the purpose of remediating the contamination.69
Liable parties are subject to strict, joint, and several liability7" for all
remedial action costs7 ' and any damages to natural resources that occur
as a result of the release "or threatened release" of hazardous
substances.72 MTCA requires PLPs to conduct remedial actions or pay
the state to conduct those remedial actions.73 Washington's Attorney
General may recover all remedial action costs from the liable parties at
the request of the Department of Ecology (DOE).74
MTCA provides certain affirmative defenses that may absolve the
PLP of liability.7 These defenses are primarily limited to those situations
in which the PLP is innocent, oblivious, or both, with respect to
environmental contamination. 76 If the PLP can establish that the
contamination was caused by an "act of God, 77 an "act of war,"78 or "the
67. See infra Part II.B.
68. See infra Part I.D.
69. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.040.
70. Strict liability is "[Iliability that does not depend on actual negligence or intent to harm, but
that is based on the breach of an absolute duty to make something safe." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
926 (7th ed. 1999). Joint and several liability is:
[I]liability that may be apportioned either among two or more parties or to only one or a few
select members of the group, at the adversary's discretion. Thus, each liable party is individually
responsible for the entire obligation, but a paying party may have a right of contribution and
indemnity from nonpaying parties.
Id.
71. See infra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
72. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.040(2).
73. Id. §§ 70.105D.030(l)(b), .040(2).
74. Id. § 70.105D.040(2).
75. Id. § 70.105D.040(3).
76. Id.
77. Id. § 70.105D.040(3)(a)(i). MTCA does not define "act of God."
78. Id. § 70.105D.040(3)(a)(ii). MTCA does not define "act of war."
1230
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act or omission of a third party,' '79 the PLP is not liable under MTCA. °
Moreover, if the PLP can show by a preponderance of the evidence that,
upon acquiring the property, the PLP neither knew nor had reason to
know that any hazardous substance had been released or disposed of on
the property, the PLP is not liable under MTCA.8'
MTCA absolves governmental entities from liability in certain
circumstances. The statute states that the term "owner/operator," for the
purposes of MTCA liability, does not include governmental agencies
"which acquired ownership or control involuntarily.""2 It is not clear
whether MTCA's involuntary acquisition exception to a government's
MTCA liability includes the exercise of eminent domain. However, some
commentators have indicated that a similar provision in CERCLA 3 may
include circumstances in which the government acquires the property
through eminent domain. 4 Because Washington courts often look to
CERCLA for guidance in interpreting MTCA,"5 it is possible that such an
interpretation would extend to MTCA as well. Thus, it is unclear whether
a governmental entity that acquires contaminated property through
eminent domain is liable for remediation under MTCA.
79. Id. § 70.105D.040(3)(a)(iii). This defense does not apply if the potentially liable party had a
direct or indirect contractual relationship with the third party. Id.
80. Id. § 70.105D.040(3).
81. Id. § 70,105D.040(3)(b). This is subject to certain restrictions. For example, the property
owner must have made reasonable inquiries into prior uses of the property to show that he or she had
no reason to know of the contamination. Id. § 70.105D.040(3)(b)(i). Moreover, the court will take
into consideration the specialized knowledge of the buyer, the purchase price for the property, the
obviousness of the condition, and commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information about
the property. Id.
82. Id. § 70.105D.020(12)(b)(i). Involuntary acquisition, for the purposes of this subsection,
means acquiring the property "through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment, or circumstances
in which the government involuntarily acquires title." Id.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (Supp. V 1999).
84. See, e.g., Lawrence P. Schnapf, CERCLA and the Substantial Continuity Test: A Unifying
ProposalforImposing CERCLA Liability Asset on Purchasers, 4 ENVTL. LAW. 435,440 n.15 (1998)
(stating that 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) "applies to state or local governments that acquired title to a
contaminated facility involuntarily through ... eminent domain"); cf Robert 1. McMurry & David
H. Pierce, Environmental Remediation and Eminent Domain, C709 ALI-ABA 105, 117 (1992)
(stating that, at least in cases in which the government condemns property for cleanup of
contaminated property, it is "involuntarily" acquiring property to protect public health and safety).
85. See Bird-Johnson Corp. v. Dana Corp., 119 Wash. 2d 423, 427, 833 P.2d 375, 377 (1992).
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B. Assessing Contamination and Determining Liability Under MTCA
Washington's legislature has delegated the authority to enforce and
administer MTCA to the DOE,86 which has promulgated regulations
governing the procedural aspects of MTCA.87 The regulations provide
for the investigation and assessment of potentially hazardous sites, and
outline the various actions that may be taken for the remediation of those
sites.88 They also establish criteria for determining the proper cleanup
level for a given piece of property.89
1. Investigation and Assessment
Both MTCA and the DOE regulations outline methods by which the
DOE can identify contaminated sites. The DOE regulations provide that
any owner or operator of a site who discovers the release of a hazardous
substance that poses a potential threat to human health must notify the
DOE within ninety days of the discovery.90 MTCA provides that if the
DOE has a reasonable basis to believe that a hazardous substance has
been or may be released, it may enter upon the property to conduct
further investigation, upon notice to the landowner.9 Furthermore, the
DOE regulations provide that the DOE may take any other actions
consistent with MTCA to identify potentially contaminated sites.92
Upon discovering a potentially hazardous site, the DOE will
investigate the site to decide what action, if any, to take with respect to
the site.93 Within ninety days of discovering the release of a hazardous
substance, the DOE will conduct an initial site investigation consisting
of, at a minimum, a visit to the site to document the conditions observed
at the site.94 Based upon the results of the investigation, the DOE will
86. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.030.
87. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-340 (2001).
88. See infra Part I.B.1.
89. See infra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
90. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-340-300(2)(a).
91. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.030(1)(a); see also WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-340-800.
92. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-340-300(1).
93. Id. § 173-340-3 10.
94. Id. § 173-340-310(2). The DOE may defer to another governmental body or independent
contractor for the purposes of conducting the investigation, as long as the other entity did not
contribute to the hazardous condition at the site. Id. § 173-340-310(3).
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decide to undertake either (1) a site hazard assessment," (2) emergency
remedial action, 6 (3) interim action," or (4) no further action.98 The
DOE maintains a list of sites requiring remedial action and sets priorities
for remedial action based upon the results of the site hazard assessment."
Once the DOE has credible evidence of liability and is prepared to
proceed with remedial action, it notifies PLPs of their potential
liability.00
The requisite level of cleanup of a piece of property depends largely
upon the nature of the site.' The proper level of cleanup is dictated by
the specific hazardous substances found at a site and the specific media,
such as soil, air, or water, by which humans and the environment could
become exposed to the hazardous substances.'0 2 To determine the proper
method to set cleanup levels, the DOE must examine the nature of the
contamination, the current and potential pathways of human and
environmental exposure to the contamination, the current and potential
receptors of the contamination, and the current and potential use of the
land. 0 3
95. Id. § 173-340-310(5)(a). "A site hazard assessment is an early study to provide preliminary
data regarding the relative potential hazard of the site." Id. § 173-340-320(4).
96. Id. § 173-340-310(5)(b). If a site requires emergency remedial action, the DOE must notify
the potentially affected area of the threat. Id. § 173-340-310(6)(a). "Emergency remedial action" is
not defined by the regulations.
97. Id. § 173-340-310(5)(c). An interim action may include an action necessary to (1) reduce the
threat to human health by eliminating or reducing "pathways for exposure" to a hazardous substance,
(2) correct a problem that may become worse or more expensive if action is delayed, or (3) complete
a site hazard assessment, remedial investigation, or feasibility study, or provide for the design of a
cleanup action. Id. § 173-340-430(1).
98. Id. § 173-340-310(5)(d). A decision to undertake no further action may be predicated upon a
determination that no hazardous substance has been released, no threat to human health exists, or
any further action is more appropriately undertaken under a different authority. Id.
99. Id. §§ 173-340-120(3), -330. A site's appearance on the hazardous sites list is not an
implication that the parties associated with the site are subject to MTCA liability. Id. § 173-340-
330(5).
100. Id. § 173-340-500; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.040 (2000).
101. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-340-700(5).
102. Id. § 173-340-700(4)(a).
103. Id. § 173-340-700(5). The Washington Administrative Code outlines three basic methods to
determine the proper level of remediation. Id. "Method A" is used for sites for which cleanup is
routine, or which involve relatively few hazardous substances. Id. § 173-340-700(5)(a). "Method B"
is the standard method used for all sites, unless one of the conditions applicable to Methods A or C
exists. Id. §§ 173-340-700(5)(b), -705(1). "Method C" is a conditional method, applicable if
compliance with Methods A or B is impossible or will cause greater environmental harm. Id. § 173-
340-700(5)(c). Method C is also applicable to certain industrial properties. Id.; see also id. § 173-
340-745 (setting forth soil cleanup standards for industrial properties).
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2. Remedial Actions
A remedial action is any action intended to identify and either
eliminate or minimize a threat to human health or the environment
caused by the release of hazardous substances.' 4 Remedial actions
include investigation, monitoring, and cleanup activities.' 5 The DOE
may initiate a remedial action by sending a negotiation letter or
enforcement order to a PLP or by requesting an "agreed order."''0 6 The
negotiation letter informs the PLP that the DOE wishes to negotiate
toward a consent decree. 0 7 The letter typically explains the nature of the
DOE's conclusions about a contaminated site, requests a written
statement of the PLP's willingness to negotiate, and asks for the names
of other PLPs."'0 An enforcement order requires a PLP to take action on
its own. 9 Under an agreed order, the PLP agrees to undertake
remediation of the site. in return, the DOE will not take action against
the PLP as long as the PLP complies with the order."' However, the
agreed order is not a settlement and, therefore, will not contain covenants
not to sue or protection from claims of contribution."' Finally, the DOE
may undertake remedial action entirely on its own if necessary, as in the
case of an emergency." 3
A PLP may also initiate a remedial action by demanding a settlement
under a consent decree, by requesting an agreed order, or simply by
taking action itself." 4 In a settlement under consent decree, the PLP
accepts responsibility for the contamination and proposes a remedial
action plan for the site)' 5 In requesting a consent decree, the PLP must
also identify other PLPs and provide information regarding the history
104. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.020(21).
105. Id.
106. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-340-510(3)(b).
107. Id. § 173-340-520(2).
108. Id. § 173-340-520(2)(b).
109. Id. § 173-340-540. The DOE generally issues the enforcement order either after it has sent a
negotiation letter or else concurrently, in the case of an emergency. Id.
110. Id. § 173-340-530(1).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. § 173-340-510(4).
114. Id. §§ 173-340-510(2), -515.
115. Id. § 173-340-520; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.040(4) (2000).
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and use of the site." 6 The Attorney General may accept the settlement if
it appears that the proposed plan is in compliance with cleanup standards
under MTCA and would expedite the cleanup process." 7
Finally, an independent remedial action"' is a remedial action
undertaken by a PLP outside of an order or decree and without the
approval or oversight of the DOE."' The DOE may, however, provide a
limited amount of informal assistance.' Within ninety days of
completion, a PLP that initiates such an action must submit to the DOE a
report containing a description of its investigation, remediation, and
monitoring conducted on the property.'' The DOE must inform the PLP
whether any further action is necessary within ninety days of receiving
the report.122
C. Recovery of Remedial Action Costs
Under MTCA, the Washington Attorney General can file an action to
recover remedial action costs that the DOE has spent to clean a
contaminated site. The Attorney General is authorized to file an action if
necessary to recover all costs incurred, including the costs of undertaking
any investigative and remedial actions.'2 Remedial action costs are any
costs "reasonably attributable" to the site, and include costs of direct
remedial activities," support costs, '5 and interest charges. 6 The
Attorney General may also bring an action against a PLP that has failed
to comply with an enforcement order or an agreed order issued by the
116. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 173-340-520(1)(v), (viii).
117. WAH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.040(4)(a); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-340-520(f).
118. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-340-515.
119. Id.
120. Id. § 173-340-515(5); see also 24 TIMOTHY H. BUTLER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
PRACTICE, in WASHINGTON PRACTICE, § 15.26 (1997).
121. WASH. ADMrN. CODE § 173-340-300(4).
122. Id. §§ 173-340-310(4),-515(4).
123. WASH. REv. CODE § 70.105D.050(3) (2000).
124. Costs of direct remedial activities include, for example, the payment of staff for work on the
site, the cost of any travel related to the site, costs incurred publishing documents with respect to the
site, the purchase or rental of any equipment necessary for remediation of the site, and the cost of
work on the site that must be contracted out. WASH. ADMiN. CODE § 173-340-550(2)(a).
125. Support costs include, for example, costs of any facilities, personnel, and administrative
support that are indirectly related to the remediation of the site. Id. § 173-340-550(2)(b)--(c).
126. Id. § 173-340-550(2).
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DOE. 27 In such an action, the Attorney General may recover up to three
times the amount that the state must incur to undertake remediation
activities, as well as a civil penalty of up to $25,000 for each day that the
PLP refuses to comply.' 28
MTCA provides that any "person" who undertakes a remedial action
on its own may recover cleanup costs and litigation expenses from
PLPs. 9 This private right of action encourages private parties to
undertake remedial actions independently. Moreover, the DOE and other
governmental entities may also bring a private right of action, as
MTCA's definition of "person" includes "state government agenc[ies]
[and] unit[s] of local government." 3° Hence, any authority that may
exercise the power of eminent domain may also bring a private right of
action under MTCA.
A party seeking recovery under the private right of action may recover
only remedial action costs that are substantially equivalent to those that
the DOE would have undertaken."3 To facilitate private rights of action,
the DOE has enumerated a number of elements that a remedial action
should contain in order to meet the substantial equivalent requirement.'3
For example, information on the site and its remediation must be
reported to the DOE,'33 the DOE must not object to the action, 34 and the
public at large must be notified of the remediation."'
D. Procedural Due Process Under MTCA
MTCA provides due process to PLPs by giving them the right to
assert defenses to liability. 36 The right to due process of law is
127. WASH. REv. CODE § 70.105D.050(1).
128. Id.
129. Id. § 70.105D.080.
130. Id. § 70.105D.020 (14). "Person" is defined as an "individual, firm, corporation, association,
partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, state government agency, unit of local
government, federal government agency, or Indian tribe." Id.
131. Id. § 70.105D.080.
132. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-340-545(2) (2001).
133. Id. § 173-340-545(2)(c)(i).
134. Id. § 173-340-545(2)(c)(ii).
135. Id. § 173-340-545(2)(c)(iii). The remedial action may also be "substantially equivalent" if it
has actually been conducted by the DOE itself, or if it is being conducted under an order or decree,
and the requirements of the decree have been fulfilled. Id. § 173-340-545(2)(a)-(b).
136. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
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embedded in the Washington State and United States Constitutions. The
Washington State Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."'37
Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
states that a state may not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."'38 In Washington, procedural due
process requires that parties whose rights are affected by a governmental
proceeding have a meaningful opportunity to be heard, and notice
calculated to advise the parties of the proceeding to allow them the
opportunity to present defenses.'39 If any "significant property interest" is
at stake, the safeguards afforded by due process are applicable.14
Encompassed within the constitutional right to due process is the
"guarantee of fair procedure," or procedural due process. 4' Procedural
due process imposes limitations upon governmental action that deprives
individuals of life, liberty, or property.'42 In a procedural due process
claim, the question is not whether the deprivation of "life, liberty, or
property" is itself unconstitutional, but whether the deprivation took
place without the procedural guarantees envisioned by the
Constitution. 43 The rules of procedural due process '"minimize
substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations of life, liberty, or property
by enabling persons to contest the basis upon which a State proposes to
deprive them of protected interests."144
137. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3.
138. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
139. Olympic Forest Prods., Inc. v. Chaussee Corp., 82 Wash. 2d 418,422, 511 P.2d 1002, 1005
(1973) (citing Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385,394 (1914), Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank& Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950), and Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
140. Id. at 428, 511 P.2d at 1008. In determining the level of process that is due, the court will
balance the interest to be protected, the risk of deprivation of that interest by the government's acts,
and the government's interest in maintaining the procedure. Silver Firs Town Homes, Inc. v. Silver
Lake Water Dist., 103 Wash. App. 411, 425, 12 P.3d 1022, 1029 (2000).
141. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990).
142. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
143. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 125.
144. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259-60 (1978) (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81
(1972)). Whether procedural due process protections are implicated in a given case depends upon
whether the interest in question falls within the ambit of "life, liberty, or property." Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972). Neither the Washington State nor the United States Constitutions
define exactly what that phrase encompasses. The United States Supreme Court has made it clear,
however, that the scope of "property interests" is broader than simply the ownership of money, real
estate, or chattel. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972). Similarly,
"liberty" means something more than simply freedom from physical confinement Id. at 572 n.1 1.
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In Mathews v. Eldridge,'45  the United States Supreme Court
articulated a three-part balancing test for identifying the requirements of
procedural due process. 4 6 Under this test, a court should attempt to
balance (1) the private interests that are affected by a governmental
action, (2) the risk that the procedures employed by a governmental actor
will result in the mistaken deprivation of those interests, and (3) the
government's own interests, including the economic and administrative
burden that the procedural protection would entail. 4 7 In implementing
this test, the Court has generally held that some minimal opportunity to
be heard is required before the government deprives an individual of
liberty or property.'48
One of the fundamental requirements of procedural due process is the
opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner."'4 9 For the opportunity to be meaningful, it must be appropriate
to the nature of the case.' ° For example, Bell v. Burson'' involved a due
process challenge to a statute that divested uninsured motorists who were
Moreover, for purposes of procedural due process, property interests "are not created by the
constitution but are reasonable expectations of entitlement derived from independent sources such as
state law." Mission Springs, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 134 Wash. 2d 947, 962 n.15, 954 P.2d 250, 257
n. 15 (1998) (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 577). Thus, a property interest may be created by a state statute
or statutory scheme. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332; Mission Springs, 134 Wash. 2d at 963, 954 P.2d
at 257 (citing Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300, 1304-05 (9th Cir. 1988)).
145. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
146. Id. at 335 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-71 (1970)).
147. Id.
148. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 127-28 (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,
542 (1985); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 606-07 (1979); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v.
Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 18 (1978); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974); Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 80-84; Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264). Once a court has
determined whether the protections of procedural due process apply, it must then determine exactly
what process is due. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541.
Again, neither the Washington State nor the United States Constitutions dictate exactly what level
or character of due process must be afforded in a given situation. The concept of due process is
"flexible," and will vary according to the demands of the particular situation. Mathews, 424 U.S. at
334 (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481). The determination of what process is due depends upon
what rights are at stake and entails 'a determination of the precise nature of the government
function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action."'
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481 (quoting Cafeteria & Rest. Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961)). The same procedural rule won't necessarily satisfy the requirements of due process in every
context; "[t]hus, procedures adequate to determine a welfare claim may not suffice to try a felony
charge." Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971).
149. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267 (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
150. Bell, 402 U.S. at 542.
151. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
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involved in accidents of their driver's licenses unless they posted security
sufficient to cover the damage alleged by the other party to the
accident.' 52 The United States Supreme Court held that, under the statute,
motorists were entitled to a hearing wherein they were afforded an
opportunity to present defenses to liability. 3 Further, Goldberg v.
Kelly 4 involved a procedural due process claim for the wrongful
termination of welfare benefits. The Supreme Court similarly held that
the "meaningful" requirement dictated that individuals who were being
deprived of their public assistance should have notice of the reasons for
the termination and an opportunity to defend themselves by confronting
adverse witnesses and presenting arguments and evidence.-'
In Washington, procedural due process requires that parties whose
rights are affected by a governmental proceeding have, at a minimum, a
meaningful opportunity to be heard and notice calculated to advise them
of the proceeding, to allow the party to present defenses.'56 Moreover,
Washington courts also hold that the opportunity must be presented "at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."'57 If any "significant
property interest" is at stake, the safeguards afforded by due process .are
applicable.' In Olympic Forest Products, Inc. v. Chaussee Corp.,59 the
Washington Supreme Court articulated the specific procedures required
by due process. It determined that a court must consider the nature of the
affected interest, the manner in which it is affected, the government's
reasons for acting as it did, what procedural alternatives are available, the
amount of protection that ought to be given to the governmental actor,
and the balance between the benefit accomplished and the detriment
suffered. 161
152. Id. at 535-36.
153. Id. at 541-42.
154. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
155. Id. at 267-68.
156. Olympic Forest Prods., Inc. v. Chaussee Corp., 82 Wash. 2d 418, 422, 511 P.2d 1002, 1005
(1973) (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385,394 (1914)). In Washington,
the court will balance the interest to be protected, the risk of deprivation of that interest by the
government's acts, and the government's interest in maintaining the procedure. See, e.g., Silver Firs
Town Homes, Inc. v. Silver Lake Water Dist., 103 Wash. App. 411,425, 12 P.3d 1022, 1029 (2000).
157. Olympic Forest Prods., 82 Wash. 2d at 422, 511 P.2d at 1005.
158. Id. at 428, 511 P.2d at 1008.
159. 82 Wash. 2d 418, 511 P.2d 1002 (1973).
160. Id. at 423-24, 511 P.2d at 1006 (citing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 163 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
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III. JURISDICTIONS ARE SPLIT ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
EVIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION IN
EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS
There is a split of authority across the United States on the issue of
whether evidence of environmental contamination should be admissible
to determine just compensation in eminent domain proceedings.' 6 '
Jurisdictions that refuse to admit such evidence have expressed concern
that it would circumvent procedures already established by
environmental laws and regulations for determining liability for
contamination and result in additional liability for the condemnee.
Jurisdictions that admit the evidence reason that contamination is a
property characteristic-which must necessarily be taken into account to
determine fair market value-and that environmental contamination
creates a "stigma" upon property.
A. Excluding the Evidence
1. Considerations ofAdditional Liability
At least one court has refused to admit evidence of environmental
contamination in an eminent domain proceeding in order to prevent the
potential for extra liability for the landowners. 162 In Aladdin, Inc. v. Black
Hawk County,163 a county condemned a contaminated laundry facility in
preparation for building a new jail164 and sought to reduce the
compensation it paid for the property on account of the environmental
contamination.165  Because Iowa law provided for administrative
procedures to remedy environmental contamination, the Iowa Supreme
161. Thus far, very few jurisdictions have considered the problem at all. A majority in favor of
admitting the evidence has emerged. See, e.g., Redev. Agency v. Thrifty Oil Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d
687, 689 n.9 (Cal. Ct. App.1992); State Dep't of Health v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993, 1008 (Colo.
1994); N.E. Econ. Alliance, Inc. v. ATC P'ship, 776 A.2d 1068, 1080 (Conn. 2001); Finkelstein v.
Dep't of Transp., 656 So.2d 921, 922 (Fla. 1995); City of Olathe v. Stott, 861 P.2d 1287, 1290 (Kan.
1993); State v. Hughes, 986 P.2d 700, 703 (Or. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Brandon, 898 S.W.2d 224,
226-27 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994). But see Dep't of Transp. v. Parr, 633 N.E.2d 19 (111. Ct. App. 1994);
Aladdin, Inc. v. Black Hawk County, 562 N.W.2d 608, 615 (Iowa 1997).
162. Aladdin, 562 N.W.2d at 615.
163. 562 N.W.2d 608 (Iowa 1997).
164. Id. at 610.
165. Id
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Court expressed concern that the landowner would incur additional
liability if evidence of the contamination were admitted. The court
reasoned that if the proper administrative procedures were not followed
with respect to the environmental remediation, and the contamination
were figured into the amount of compensation for the property, "the
landowner will not receive just compensation because the award will be
less than full value. In addition, the property owner will have the same
legal liability for cleanup cost as before."'66
2. Procedural Due Process Concerns
The Aladdin court was also concerned that admitting contamination
evidence would compromise the landowner's due process rights.'67 In
Iowa, as in Washington, the environmental cleanup statute contained
procedural safeguards for the benefit of the landowner.'68 The Aladdin
court held that admitting evidence of environmental contamination
would deprive the landowner of just compensation.169 In making its
determination, the Aladdin court cited procedural due process concerns,
expressing the fear that the scope of procedural guarantees available in
an environmental liability adjudication would not be available in the
context of eminent domain. 7 ° The court reasoned that a landowner has
the right to have environmental cleanup liability adjudicated in a
proceeding in which there is an opportunity to show that the landowner is
not responsible for the contamination. 7 ' Therefore, effectively
establishing the landowner's liability in a condemnation proceeding
would violate the landowner's procedural due process rights.7"
Furthermore, if another party is able to prove that the landowner is
legally responsible for the contamination, the remediation costs can be
recovered in an environmental action after completion of the eminent
domain proceeding."3
166. Id. at 615.
167. Id. at 615-16.
168. See id. at 615.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 615-16.
171. Id. at 615.
172. Id.
173. Id. The Aladdin court was also concerned that valuation of contaminated property would be
problematic due to the difficulty of locating comparable contaminated property, and that the fact-
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In Department of Transportation v. Parr,74 the Illinois Court of
Appeals also excluded evidence of environmental contamination in an
eminent domain proceeding due to procedural due process concerns.17 5 In
Parr, the Illinois Department of Transportation condemned a
landowner's contaminated property to construct a bridge.176 The Illinois
environmental statute, like MTCA, set forth a comprehensive process for
remediating environmental contamination and adjudicating liability. 77
Among other things, the statute provided for certain procedural
safeguards to protect landowners when adjudicating liability for
environmental contamination. 78 The court held that admitting evidence
of environmental contamination would violate the procedural due
process rights of the condemnees, because it would allow the
condemning authority to circumvent the procedural safeguards
implemented to protect the rights of landowners under the statutory
scheme. 79 The court noted that procedural due process requires that
"orderly proceedings" advance according to rules that do not violate the
fundamental rights of the parties involved. 8 Therefore, depriving
landowners of the rights and defenses afforded by the Illinois
environmental statute would constitute a violation of procedural due
process. 18
B. Admitting the Evidence: Environmental Contamination as a
Property Characteristic
Some courts admit evidence of environmental contamination in
eminent domain proceedings on the basis that it is a property
characteristic and necessarily affects the fair market value of property.'
finder would be required to speculate as to the effect of the contamination upon the property's value.
Id. at 616.
174. 633 N.E.2d 19 (111. Ct. App. 1994).
175. Id. at 22.
176. Id. at 20.
177. Id. at 22-23.
178. Id. at 22.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 23.
181. Id. at22.
182. See, e.g., Redev. Agency v. Thrifty Oil Co., 5 Cal. Rtpr. 2d 687, 689 n.9 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992); City ofOlathe v. Stott, 861 P.2d 1287, 1290 (Kan. 1993); State v. Hughes, 986 P.2d 700, 703
(Or. Ct. App. 1999).
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For example, in State v. Hughes,83 an Oregon court of appeals held that
the evidence of contamination is admissible in an eminent domain
action. 4 In Hughes, the State of Oregon condemned contaminated
property for a highway improvement project. 5 After condemning the
property, the condemnor discovered that petroleum contamination was
present in the groundwater beneath the site.'86 Citing Oregon's
evidentiary rule for relevance,'87 the court reasoned that, although the
contamination was discovered subsequent to the condemnation, the
evidence could have been discovered on the date the action was
commenced and would bear on the fair market value of the property at
the time. 8 Therefore, the evidence would "easily pass the threshold for
relevance" and should be admitted in a proceeding to determine just
compensation.89
In Finkelstein v. Department of Transportation,9 ' the Florida
Supreme Court admitted evidence of environmental contamination to
determine just compensation in an eminent domain proceeding on the
basis that there is a "stigma" associated with contaminated property that
affects its market value.'9 ' In Finkelstein, the Florida Department of
Transportation condemned a piece of property in connection with the
construction of an interstate highway. The Florida Supreme Court held
that, as long as the facts show that environmental contamination actually
has an effect on the market value of the property to be condemned,
evidence of environmental contamination is admissible to determine just
183. 986 P.2d 700 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).
184. Id. at 703.
185. Id. at701.
186. Id. at 702. The court did not discuss any applicable environmental remediation statute in
Oregon.
187. "Relevant evidence" means "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence." Id. at 703.
188. Id.
189. Id.; see also Redev. Agency v. Thrifty Oil Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687, 689 n.9 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992) (stating that remediation issue was properly before jury as a property characteristic that
affected value of land); City of Olathe v. Stott, 861 P.2d 1287, 1290 (Kan. 1993) (stating that
evidence of contamination should be admissible in eminent domain proceeding because a purpose of
an eminent domain proceeding is to determine fair market value of subject property and
contamination affects that value).
190. 656 So.2d 921 (Fla. 1995).
191. Id. at 924.
192. See Dep't ofTransp. v. Finkelstein, 629 So.2d 932, 932 (Fla. Ct. App. 1993).
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compensation.' 93 The court supported its conclusion with an earlier
decision holding that the public fear of power lines is relevant to the
market value of property.1 94 The Finkelstein court listed several reasons
why the stigma associated with contaminated property would affect its
market value. 95 For example, a buyer on the open market would consider
the cost of remediating the contamination and the buyer would be subject
to strict, joint, and several liability for contamination under
environmental statutes.1 96 The contamination would subject the buyer to
liability to the community. 197 Finally, lenders would hesitate to finance
the acquisition or improvement of contaminated property, particularly if
the financing arrangement could subject the lender to liability for the
contamination. 198
Recently, in Northeast Connecticut Economic Alliance, Inc. v. ATC
Partnership,199 a municipal government condemned a contaminated
parcel of property as part of a regional redevelopment plan, seeking to
pay $1 in compensation due to the contaminated state of the property.2"
193. Finkelstein v. Dep't of Transp., 656 So.2d 921, 922 (Fla. 1995).
194. See id. at 924:
Holding contamination to be relevant to the market value of property in an eminent domain
valuation proceeding is consistent with our decision in Florida Power & Light Co. v. Jennings,
518 So.2d 895 (Fla. 1987), in which we held that "any factor including public fear which
impacts on the market value of land taken for a public purpose may be considered to explain the
basis for an expert's valuation opinion."
As noted previously, Washington courts do not follow this reasoning. See State v. Evans, 96 Wash.
2d 119, 127, 634 P.2d 845, 849 (1981), opinion amended, 649 P.2d 633 (1982).
195. Finkelstein, 656 So.2d at 924. The court defined "stigma" as "the reduction in value caused
by contamination resulting from the increased risk associated with the contaminated property. In
sum, many prospective buyers are afraid of the financial risk associated with contaminated or even
previously contaminated properties and would therefore pay less for the property." Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. Ultimately, however, the Finkelstein court concluded that the evidence of contamination
was not admissible in the case before it, as there was not a sufficient factual basis for the state
expert's valuation opinion. Id. at 925. Because there was no factual evidence in the record upon
which to base the conclusion that the property's value had actually been compromised by the alleged
environmental contamination, the landowner was entitled to the fair market value of the property
without respect to contamination. Id.
199. 776 A.2d 1068 (Conn. 2001).
200. Id. at 1072-73. The trial court had held that the contamination evidence was not admissible.
N.E. Econ. Alliance, Inc. v. ATC P'ship, No. CV 940049248S, 1998 WL 197632, *15 (Conn. Super.
April 16, 1998). During the pendency of the parties' appeal, the Connecticut legislature amended its
eminent domain statute to provide that evidence of environmental contamination is admissible to
determine just compensation. ATC Pship, 776 A.2d at 1076 (citing Public Acts 2000, No. 00-89,
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There, the court held that "evidence of environmental contamination and
remediation costs is relevant to the valuation of real property taken by
eminent domain and admissible in a condemnation proceeding to show
the effect, if any, that those factors had on the fair market value of the
property on the date of the taking."2 The court reasoned that failing to
admit the evidence would result in a "fictional" property value, because a
purchaser of property on the open market would base the price it was
willing to pay on a variety of factors, including (1) potential liability for
the contamination, (2) "stigma" related to the property even after it has
been remediated, (3) increased financing costs charged by lending
institutions, and (4) the potential for increased regulation.2 °2
IV. EVIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION
SHOULD NOT BE ADMISSIBLE TO DETERMINE JUST
COMPENSATION IN WASHINGTON EMINENT DOMAIN
PROCEEDINGS
Washington courts should not admit evidence of environmental
contamination to determine just compensation in eminent domain
proceedings. First, evidence of environmental contamination falls short
of Washington's rule prohibiting overly speculative evidence. Second,
admitting evidence of environmental contamination in eminent domain
proceedings deprives landowners of defenses and procedural safeguards
under MTCA, thereby constituting a violation of procedural due process.
Finally, admitting the evidence may effectively result in additional
liability for the landowner and a windfall to the condemnor.
A. Evidence of Environmental Contamination Should Not Be Admitted
To Determine Just Compensation Because It Contradicts
Washington's Prohibition Against Speculative Evidence in Eminent
Domain Proceedings
Admitting evidence of environmental contamination for the purpose
of valuing property in an eminent domain proceeding would require the
entitled "An Act Concerning Fair Market Value Of Brownfields"). However, the ATC Partnership
court did not decide whether the new provision applied retroactively, but instead based its
determination on "traditional constitutional principles ofjust compensation." Id.
201. ATCP'ship, 776 A.2d at 1080.
202. Id. at 1081.
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jury to engage in impermissible speculation.0 3 In determining just
compensation in Washington eminent domain proceedings, the jury may
not consider evidence that "is remote, imaginary, or speculative.
Juries may only consider those elements that have an actual effect on the
property's fair market value and are established by evidence. 25 For
example, the market value of a parcel of land with mineral content may
not be determined by using an estimated market price for the mineral as
extracted.26 This would entail speculation about, among other things, the
costs of extracting and marketing the mineral and the nature and extent
of demand for the mineral.20 7
Similarly, devaluing property based on contamination would require
the jury to speculate about the extent of contamination, the necessary
responses, and the response costs. Under MTCA, liability for cleanup is
based upon all costs which are "reasonably attributable" to remediation
of the property.23 By definition, costs may not be attributed to
remediation of the contamination until cleanup is complete, as the DOE
expects to receive payment of remediation costs as they are incurred.0 9
In addition, cleanup may take years to complete and, consequently, may
not be completed while an eminent domain proceeding is taking place.
The full extent of contamination and necessary expenses may not be
known until the cleanup is complete.210 Therefore, attempting to estimate
the costs of cleanup before remediation is complete and the full extent of
the contamination is known would involve a great deal of conjecture.
Moreover, even if accurate evidence regarding the extent of the
contamination is admitted, the jury would need to speculate to determine
the effect of the contamination on the property's value. As at least one
commentator has noted, the potential range of devaluation due to
203. Cf In re City of Medina, 69 Wash. 2d 574, 578, 418 P.2d 1020, 1023 (1966).
204. State v. Evans, 96 Wash. 2d 119, 127, 634 P.2d 845, 849 (1981), opinion amended, 649 P.2d
633 (1982).
205. Id.
206. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 101-28 and accompanying text.
209. BUTLER, supra note 120, § 15.57.
210. See Robert I. McMurry, Treatment of Environmental Contamination in Eminent Domain
Cases, C975 ALI-ABA 237, 247 (1995) (stating that "consultants will concede that environmental
investigations are more than a little like handicapping horse races: there is some science involved
and some things we can put into statistics, but a big part of the equation is uncertain, unpredictable,
incalculable, and perhaps even unknowable").
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contamination can be vast."' Moreover, the average jury may not be
equipped to handle the complicated technical information involved with
environmental contamination and its effect on market value.212
Use of the accepted valuation methodologies in Washington eminent
domain proceedings does not make determining environmental
contamination and its effect on market value in an eminent domain
proceeding any less speculative. For example, under the income
capitalization approach, the value of a plot of land is measured by
projecting the amount of income it is likely to produce, subtracting future
expenses, and capitalizing at an appropriate discount rate."'
Environmental contamination may theoretically be considered a future
expense which is deducted from the projected income stream.2"4
However, even under this formula, the jury would be required to
speculate with respect to the extent of environmental contamination, the
necessary remediation measures, and the costs of cleanup.
The comparable sales approach is of little help. Under that approach,
the value of a given piece of property is determined by comparing it with
similar properties that have been sold within a reasonable period of
time.21 In the case of contaminated property, it would be necessary to
find another piece of property that is similarly contaminated and similar
in other respects, such as size, location, and zoning. Since the character
and extent of contamination tends to be unique to a given piece of
property, it would be exceedingly difficult to locate similar property
upon which to draw a comparison." 6 Moreover, comparing contaminated
property to uncontaminated property that is similar in other respects
would certainly be speculative. As one Washington court has noted, even
a comparison of undeveloped land with fully developed property to
211. 7A JULIUS SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 13B.03[2][i][ii] (3d Ed. Rev. 2000).
212. SACKmAN, supra note 211, § 13B.03[2][i][iii]; Amy Grigham Boulris, Dealing with
Contaminated Landfrom the Condemnee's Perspective, C975 ALI-ABA 197, 203 (1995).
213. See SACKMAN, supra note 211, § 13B.04[2].
214. See SACKMAN, supra note 211, § 13B.04[2].
215. See SACKMAN, supra note 36, § 12.02(1], at 12-72.
216. See Aladdin, Inc. v. Black Hawk County, 562 N.W.2d 608, 616 (Iowa 1997) ("Properties
with contamination are hard to compare because they involve multiple varieties of contamination of
varying concentrations and require assorted methods of cleanup. The commission, judge, or jury
required to determine 'just compensation' would likely be compelled to speculate as to the
damages."). See also Robert I. McMurry & David H. Pierce, Environmental Contamination and Its
Effect on Eminent Domain, C791 ALI-ABA 133, 162. Although locating similar property may not,
in all cases, be impossible, considerations of judicial economy suggest it would be inefficient to
always attempt to do so.
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estimate market value leads to impermissible speculation and
conjecture. 2 7 As that court declared, a court "cannot be too careful in
excluding evidence of this character."2 '
The depreciated replacement cost method is similarly unavailing.
Under that approach, just compensation is measured by determining the
replacement costs of improvements on the property, subtracting
depreciation, and adding the market value of the underlying property.1 9
Such an approach simply begs the question: once the cost of
improvements and the amount of depreciation have been established, the
market value of the property itself must still be determined. Presumably,
this will require recourse to the methodologies previously discussed.22°
Thus, the depreciated replacement cost method falls short, for the same
reasons that the income capitalization and comparable sales approaches
fail. 22
1
Some jurisdictions that admit evidence of environmental
contamination to determine just compensation have much more liberal
standards than Washington for admitting speculative evidence. 22
Therefore, they do not provide persuasive precedent for admitting such
evidence in Washington. For example, Florida courts will consider
evidence of the public's fear of a condition on land to determine its
market value. 223 Based in part upon that reasoning, the Finkelstein court
was willing to admit evidence of environmental contamination in an
eminent domain proceeding, stating that doing so is consistent with the
notion that "any factor including public fear which impacts on the market
value of land taken for a public purpose may be considered .... 24
However, Washington has eschewed the admissibility of speculative
217. In re City of Medina, 69 Wash. 2d 574, 578, 418 P.2d 1020, 1022-23 (1966).
218. Id.
219. See SACKMAN, supra note 36, § 12.02[11.
220. See supra notes 213-18 and accompanying text.
221. For a discussion of novel valuation methodologies that may alleviate the problem to some
degree, see McMurry & Pierce, supra note 216, at 165-69 (suggesting that these novel alternatives
are still somewhat unsatisfactory); see also SACKMAN, supra note 211, § 13B.04[2] (listing newer
valuation methods but noting that "[t]he development of techniques for valuing contaminated
properties is still in its infancy") (internal quotation marks omitted).
222. See, e.g., Finkelstein v. Dep't of Transp., 656 So.2d 921, 924 (Fla. 1995) (citing Fla. Power
& Light Co. v. Jennings, 518 So.2d 895 (Fla. 1987)).
223. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
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evidence like public fear.' Thus, one of the primary rationales relied
upon by jurisdictions admitting evidence of environmental contamination
in eminent domain proceedings is inapplicable in Washington.
B. Admitting Evidence of Environmental Contamination To Determine
Just Compensation in an Eminent Domain Proceeding Violates the
Procedural Due Process Rights ofLandowners
Admitting evidence of environmental contamination to determine just
compensation would circumvent the procedural safeguards established
by MTCA and, therefore, constitute a violation of procedural due
process. To determine whether governmental action constitutes a
violation of procedural due process, a court must first determine whether
a party has been deprived of a property interest.226 Upon finding such a
deprivation, the court must then determine the level of process that is
due. 7 Applying the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge,22'
admission of evidence of environmental contamination to determine just
compensation will result in the mistaken deprivation of the landowner's
property interests with no significant concomitant governmental benefit
and is therefore a violation of the landowner's right to procedural due
process.
Reducing just compensation in an eminent domain proceeding due to
environmental contamination deprives a landowner of an important
property interest. One of the fundamental principles behind just
compensation in eminent domain is the requirement that the property
owner be put in the same monetary position as she would have occupied
had the property not been taken. 9 Payment of anything less than full
compensation divests the landowner of that important interest.
Under the Mathews balancing test, a court must balance (1) the private
interests that are affected by a governmental action, (2) the risk that the
procedures employed by the governmental actor will result in the
mistaken deprivation of those interests, and (3) the government's own
225. See, eg., State v. Evans, 96 Wash. 2d 119, 127,634 P.2d 845,849 (1981), opinion amended,
649 P.2d 633 (1982); Pac. N.W. Pipeline Corp. v. Myers, 50 Wash. 2d 288,290,311 P.2d 655, 656
(1957).
226. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
228. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
229. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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interests, including the economic and administrative burden that the
procedural protection would entail.23 ° Reducing just compensation due to
environmental contamination in an eminent domain proceeding deprives
the landowner of full compensation, without affording the landowner the
procedural safeguards outlined in MTCA. MTCA provides a thorough
procedural framework for investigating the existence of contamination
and assigning responsibility for any contamination discovered. It
provides the landowner with numerous options for mitigating the
contamination,"' offers certain defenses to liability, 3 ' affords the right to
seek contribution from other PLPs, 33 and enables the landowner to bring
a private right of action by remediating the property according to DOE
standards. 34 An eminent domain proceeding provides the landowner
with none of these procedural safeguards and, thus, may not be a level of
process that is appropriate to the nature of the interests being divested. 35
At the same time, preventing the governmental entity from paying
reduced compensation on account of contamination does not deprive it of
its interests. On the contrary, whatever interests the government has-for
example, remediating contaminated property and holding landowners
responsible for the contamination-is amply addressed by MTCA. In
addition, any financial loss sustained by the condemnor in paying full
value for contaminated property can be amply redressed by forcing the
PLPs to remediate the contamination under MTCA. If the proper
procedures are employed under MTCA, the government wins by
recovering cleanup expenses in an action against the PLP, and the
landowner wins by maintaining her procedural guarantees.
Courts in other jurisdictions have come to similar conclusions. 36 For
example, Department of Transportation v. Part23 7 involved an
environmental statute similar to MTCA in that it assigned liability for
environmental contamination while providing landowners with certain
procedural safeguards. 238 There, the court concluded that adjudicating
230. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
231. See supra Part II.B.
232. See supra Part II.A.
233. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
236. See, e.g., Dep't of Transp. v. Parr, 633 N.E.2d 19, 22 (I1l. Ct. App. 1994); Aladdin, Inc. v.
Black Hawk County, 562 N.W.2d 608, 615 (Iowa 1997).
237. 633 N.E.2d 19, (Il1. Ct. App. 1994).
238. Id. at 22-23.
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liability for environmental contamination in an eminent domain
proceeding would constitute a procedural due process violation, because
it would circumvent the rights, defenses, and procedural safeguards
established by the statute."9 Because the same holds true under
Washington law, Washington should adopt the Parr court's reasoning
and preclude consideration of environmental contamination to determine
just compensation.
C. Evidence of Environmental Contamination Should Not Be Admitted
in an Eminent Domain Proceeding Because It May Create
Additional Liability for the Landowner and Result in a Windfallfor
the Condemnor
Where the landowner is a PLP under MTCA, admitting evidence of
contamination to determine just compensation potentially subjects the
landowner to additional liability. First, the landowner receives a reduced
price for the property in an eminent domain proceeding due to a
determination that the contamination affects its fair market value. Then,
the landowner may be subject to liability in a MTCA action and may
consequently be forced to pay remediation costs for the contamination.
The landowner is forced to sell the land at a price reduced by
environmental contamination and subsequently required to pay for the
cleanup of the same contamination. Therefore, the landowner is
effectively subject to additional liability in the amount that the just
compensation is reduced.
Although additional liability may also result if the landowner simply
sells the property on the open market and is later held liable for remedial
action under MTCA, there are important distinctions between a
transaction on the open market and an eminent domain action. No one is
forcing the landowner to sell in a transaction on the open market. The
seller may prefer to remediate the property on her own and sell at a
higher price, rather than selling at a reduced price due to the
contamination and later being held liable under MTCA. Moreover, if no
buyer is willing to pay what the landowner considers a fair price, the
landowner may find it more economically efficient to simply keep the
property and take her chances with future liability.
Furthermore, the landowner can bargain away future MTCA liability
if permitted to sell the land on the open market. For example, the
239. Id.
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landowner may agree to sell the land at a discounted rate in exchange for
the buyer's promise to indemnify the landowner against any future
MTCA liability. 24° In this way, the landowner avoids additional MTCA
liability because, although the seller may receive a reduced rate due to
the contamination, he or she can avoid future liability under MTCA.
Similarly, the parties to a voluntary sale may agree to mitigate potential
MTCA liability by taking independent action to remediate environmental
contamination. In an eminent domain action, however, the landowner is
deprived of the bargaining power to negotiate such a trade.
Similarly, admitting evidence of environmental contamination to
determine just compensation may effectively give the condemning
authority a windfall. First, the condemning authority acquires the
property at a reduced price. Then, once the contamination has been
cleaned, the condemnor may subsequently hold the landowner
responsible for remediation costs under MTCA. Not only is the state
Attorney General entitled to recover its remediation costs from the
PLP, 4' but any governmental entity that may condemn property by
eminent domain may also bring a private right of action under MTCA.242
In effect, the condemning authority purchases the property at a price
adjusted for contamination, but ultimately receives a piece of property
free of contamination. Thus, the condemnor receives a windfall in the
amount that the just compensation is reduced for contamination.
V. CONCLUSION
Evidence of environmental contamination should not be admissible to
determine just compensation in a Washington eminent domain
proceeding. Although it is true that environmental contamination may
have an impact on the market value of land, admitting this evidence
contravenes Washington's prohibition against speculative evidence to
determine just compensation, violates the procedural due process rights
240. See Car Wash Enters. v. Kampamos, 74 Wash. App. 537, 544, 874 P.2d 868, 873 (holding
that nothing in MTCA prohibits private parties from allocating risk amongst themselves, though
emphasizing that such a private agreement has no effect on liability as to the state); cf Boeing Co. v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 113 Wash. 2d 869, 887, 784 P.2d 507, 516 (1990) (holding that response
costs under CERCLA are "damages" within the meaning of an insurance policy); see also Olds-
Olympic, Inc. v. Comm. Union Ins. Co., 129 Wash. 2d 464, 473, 918 P.2d 923, 927 (1996) (stating
that the holding in Boeing applies to MTCA).
241. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.050 (2000).
242. See supra notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
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of landowners, and may result in a windfall for the condemnor and
additional liability for the landowner. There is no doubt that the cleanup
of contaminated property should be a public priority of the highest order,
for the well-being of Washington and for the planet as a whole.
However, this interest must be balanced against the interest citizens have
in receiving just compensation when their land is taken by the
government. Washington has established a comprehensive and effective
scheme for addressing the problem of environmental contamination,
which provides for the landowners' interests as well as the public
interest. The problem of environmental contamination should be
addressed under that scheme-condemnors should not have the option of
circumventing MTCA in order to obtain property at fire sale prices.
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